

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

----- 123209

O P 111148Z MAR 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2478

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SALT TWO GENEVA 0074

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 10, 1975

(SALT TWO-553)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER  
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF MARCH 10, 1975.

QUOTE

I

THROUGHOUT THIS PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE USSR  
DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY NOTED THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO  
TIE DOWN IN APPROPRIATE ARTICLES OF THE NEW AGREEMENT,  
PROVISIONS OBLIGATING THE SIDES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE ARMS QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY, AND  
ALSO TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES  
OF SUCH ARMS. IN PARTICULAR, APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS ARE  
CONTAINED IN ARTICLES I, VIII AND IX OF THE SOVIET DRAFT,

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AND WE PROVIDED THE RATIONALE THEREFOR IN STATEMENTS ON

FEBRUARY 4 AND 18, AND MARCH 4, 1975. TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO SET FORTH CONSIDERATIONS ON THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, BEARING IN MIND THAT TO CONSIDER IT COMPREHENSIVELY AND TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IS IN ACCORD WITH OUR ASSIGNED TASK OF PREPARING A JOINT DRAFT TEXT FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE DETERMINING ELEMENT IN THE APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION IS THAT THE SIDES HAVE AGREED THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT COULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMS DURING THE TERM OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. AS YOU KNOW, THIS COMMON UNDERSTANDING WAS RECORDED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974.

PROCEEDING FROM THIS COMMON UNDERSTANDING, IT IS IMPORTANT TO ACHIEVE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION ON INCLUDING IN THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT PROVISIONS CONCERNING EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT BY THE SIDES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE ADVISABILITY OF INCLUDING SUCH PROVISIONS IS DICTATED BY WEIGHTY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED, AS WELL AS TO THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN ITS LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE.

ASSUMPTION BY THE USSR AND THE U.S. OF RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD NOT ONLY INCREASE THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF, WHICH IS BEING WORKED OUT, AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR THEREIN, BUT WOULD UNDERSTANDABLY ALSO CONSTITUTE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS A WHOLE, AND WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING GENERAL PEACE AND SECURITY, HALTING THE ARMS RACE, AND REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER PREPARATION,  
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AN APPROPRIATE CONCRETE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SITUATION ARISING IN WHICH, IN SPITE OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, ON SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, PRECONDITIONS WOULD REMAIN FOR A BUILDUP IN OTHER, NEW TYPES OF THESE ARMS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF WHICH DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT

IN PRINCIPLE APPEARS TO BE A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY. A SITUATION OF THIS KIND, WHICH COULD HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985, MUST BE PRECLUDED. ADOPTION OF AGREED MEASURES IN THIS DIRECTION, IN PARTICULAR BY BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, MEETS THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES.

AGREEMENT ON APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS RECORDING THE COMMON APPROACH OF THE SIDES TO THIS ASPECT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITATION, AS WELL AS SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS BY THE SIDES TO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IS IN ACCORD WITH THE ESSENCE OF THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL CONCERNING THE BASIC FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD BE STILL ANOTHER SPECIFIC INSTANCE OF EMBODYING THE POLICY RECORDED IN THE JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN DOCUMENTS OF 1972-1974, TO UNDERTAKE COMMON EFFORTS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC ARMS AND TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

## II

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH ON SOME OF THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM.

OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AMONG THE OBLIGATIONS BY THE SIDES UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE AN OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE IX, PARAGRAPH (A) OF THE SOVIET SECRET

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DRAFT.

ASSUMPTION OF A CORRESPONDING OBLIGATION WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEM. INDEED, IN VIEW OF THEIR INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE AND CAPABILITY OF CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SUCH MISSILES, IF DEVELOPED, COULD BE USED FOR STRIKING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. IT IS CLEAR THAT BOTH SIDES ARE EQUALLY INTERESTED IN PREVENTING THE CYCLE INVOLVED IN THIS, AND THIS CANNOT BUT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE WOULD THUS SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ENHANCING THE VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS, PROVIDED FOR THEREIN.

IN CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION, IT IS IMPORTANT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME THIS STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEM STILL DOES NOT EXIST IN THE ARSENAL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND THIS PROVIDES FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITIES TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO BAN IT. THUS, HERE WE HAVE THE NECESSITY AND OPORTUNITY FOR AGREEING ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PROVISION ON THIS SCORE.

THE QUESTION OF BANNING CRUISE MISSILES OF INTER-CONTINENTAL RANGE HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY DISCUSSED IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. WE NOTE THAT THE U.S. SIDE SUBMITTED CORRESPONDING PROPOSALS BOTH IN 1970 AND IN 1973. THUS, ON THIS QUESTION THERE IS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE. WE WOULD BELIEVE IT ADVISABLE TO NAIL DOWN THIS COMMON UNDERSTANDING IN APPROPRIATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE WHICH COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

III

THE INTERESTS OF WORKING OUT THE DRAFT OF A VIABLE AND EFFECTIVE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985 WILL ALSO BE SERVED BY CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH  
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A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS.

AS YOU KNOW, BOTH THE U.S. AND THE USSR ARE COUNTRIES WITH EXTENSIVE COASTLINES. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS WOULD MEAN THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEM WHICH, BEING DEPLOYED IN THE VAST EXPANSES OF SEAS AND OCEANS, COULD REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. BY BLOCKING A POTENTIAL CHANNEL FOR CIRCUMVENTING THE FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY FACILITATE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TASK OF CURBING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE AND REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. IN THIS QUESTION, TOO, THE INTERESTS OF THE SIDES ARE CERTAINLY MUTUAL.

IT SEEMS THAT IT WILL SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE MATTER COMPREHENSIVELY TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, WITH RESPECT TO THE TASK OF WORKING OUT THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, AND FOR THE SIDES TO RENOUNCE THEIR DEVELOPMENT,

TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT.

IV

SUBSEQUENTLY THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO ADDRESS OTHER PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT BY THE SIDES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE U.S. SIDE ON THE MEASURES PROVIDED FOR IN THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT, BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IN PARTICULAR, WITH RESPECT TO THE ASPECTS OF THIS QUESTION TOUCHED UPON TODAY.

UNQUOTE JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** AGREEMENT DRAFT, ARMS, SPEECHES, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 11 MAR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975SALTT00074  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X1  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750085-0026  
**From:** SALT TALKS  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750362/aaaacdsg.tel  
**Line Count:** 239  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 23 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <23 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <18 AUG 2003 by GarlanWA>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 10, 1975 (SALT TWO-553)  
**TAGS:** PARM, (SEMENOV)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006